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RELIEF AT THE END OF A WINDING ROAD:
USING THE THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
RULE AND ALTERNATIVE AVENUES TO
ACHIEVE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
RACHEL PARASt
And where the wind and the sun once dictated the course of
evolution, the near future of this planet resides in the mind and
action of man. The balancing of and the struggle between greed,
compassion, fear, and intelligence will now determine the
destiny of all life on Earth.'
INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any person...
the equal protection of the laws."2 Ideally, equal protection
should also extend to the safety and use of one's physical
environment. 3 For several decades, minority and low-income
t J.D. Candidate, June 2004, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 1990,
Hofstra University.
1 Charles Lynn Bragg, unpublished speech, at http://www.ecology.comquote-
week/home.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003). Mr. Bragg studied at the University of
California at Los Angeles, Pierce College and Los Angeles City College. His work
has been exhibited internationally in galleries and as illustrations for magazines
and environmental conservation campaigns.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The full text of the amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
3 See Linda D. Blank, Seeking Solutions to Environmental Inequity: The
Environmental Justice Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 1109, 1136 (1994) (stating that "[tihe
fundamental right to a clean, safe environment cannot exist only for the wealthy
[and] non-minority members of our society"); Errol Schweizer, Interview with Robert
Bullard, EARTH FIRST!, July 6, 1999 ("[E]nvironment is everything: where we live,
work, play, go to school, as well as the physical and natural world. And so we can't
separate the physical environment from the cultural environment."). As one of the
major researchers and organizers of the environmental justice movement, Dr.
Robert Bullard is also the author of many books and articles, a frequent speaker,
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
communities have been disproportionately exposed to pollution
and environmental risk.4  This problem has been called
"environmental racism" 5 and has been defined as "[any policy,
practice, or directive that, intentionally or unintentionally,
differentially impacts or disadvantages individuals, groups, or
communities based on race or color ... [as well as the]
exclusionary and restrictive practices that limit participation by
people of color in decision-making boards, commissions, and
staffs. "6
and a pioneering scholar, as well as an advocate and activist. See id.
4 Seventy-five percent of all commercial hazardous waste landfills in the
southeastern United States are located in predominantly African-American
neighborhoods. See Blank, supra note 3, at 1110 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH
RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 3 (1983)).
Furthermore:
[I]n 1986 the United Church of Christ's Commission on Racial Justice
conducted a major study which analyzed the relationship between race and
the location of hazardous waste sites across the nation. The study
discovered that race is the single best predictor of where commercial
hazardous waste facilities are located. The report further concluded that it
was virtually impossible for the disproportionate distribution to have
occurred by chance and that the underlying factors related to race affected
the location of waste facilities. Some of these underlying factors are: (1) the
availability of cheap land, often located in minority communities; (2) the
lack of local opposition, often resulting from minorities' lack of political
resources; and (3) the lack of mobility of minorities resulting from poverty.
Carolyn Graham & Jennifer B. Grills, Environmental Justice: A Survey of Federal
and State Responses, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 261 n.23 (1997) (citations omitted).
Activism occurred as early as the 1960s and 1970s; however, it went unnoticed by
policy makers, mainstream environmentalists, and the media. Id. at 239.
5 The term "Environmental Racism" was first used in 1987 by Rev. Dr.
Benjamin Chavis, former executive director of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and a long time civil-rights community
organizer and activist. Chavis reportedly coined the term as he was preparing to
present a report on toxic waste sites and race in the United States: "[I] was trying to
figure out how [I] could adequately describe what was going on. It came to me-
environmental racism. That's when I coined the term. To me, that's what it is."
Richard J. Lazarus, Innovations in Environmental Policy: "Environmental Racism!
That's What It Is," 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 255, 257. The phrases "environmental
racism," "environmental equity," and "environmental justice" are often used
interchangeably even though each phrase has its own meaning. For a brief but
thorough discussion of these subtleties, see Graham & Grills, supra note 4, at 238
n.6.
6 Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 289-90 (1995) (quoting Dr. Robert Bullard). Dr.
Bullard explained in an interview in 1999 that:
All of the issues of environmental racism and environmental justice don't
just deal with people of color. We are just as much concerned with
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Part I of this Note presents a brief history of the
environmental justice movement that arose to combat
environmental racism. Part II discusses the rise and possible
fall of Title VI of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 as an avenue of
relief for environmental justice plaintiffs. Part II.B includes a
brief discussion of the possibility of using § 1983 for
environmental justice suits. Part III presents a possibility for
plaintiffs to achieve environmental justice and resurrect a
private cause of action as third party beneficiaries to the
contracts between funding recipients and the federal
government. Part IV discusses the continued viability and
availability of preliminary injunctions and criminal prosecutions
in the pursuit of environmental justice. Part V concludes that
although environmental justice plaintiffs may not have the
direct path of a suit under Title VI, all roads to justice have not
been closed.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
A BRIEF HISTORY AND METAMORPHOSIS
"While environmentalists have traditionally battled to
protect endangered species ... nontraditional environmentalists
have struggled to protect and preserve a different endangered
species: people of color and low socioeconomic status."7
Environmental justice8 calls for uniform environmental and
inequities in Appalachia, for example, where the whites are basically
dumped on because of lack of economic and political clout and lack of
having a voice to say "no" and that's environmental injustice. So we're
trying to work with groups across the political spectrums; democrats,
republicans, independents, on the reservations, in the barrios, in the
ghettos, on the border and inter-nationally to see that we address these
issues in a comprehensive manner.
Schweizer, supra note 3. See generally ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE,
CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990).
7 Graham & Grills, supra note 4, at 237; see also Schweizer, supra note 3 ("I
think that's where the environmental justice movement is more of a grassroots
movement of ordinary people who may not see themselves as traditional
environmentalists, but are just as much concerned about the environment as
someone who may be a member of the Sierra Club or the Audubon Society.").
8 While the problem is referred to as environmental racism, the term
"environmental justice" refers to the solution. See Michael D. Mattheisen, Applying
the Disparate Impact Rule of Law to Environmental Permitting Under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 1, 3 (2000). The
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines environmental
justice as "the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of
race, ethnicity, income, national origin, or educational level with respect to the
2003]
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health conditions across races and income levels.9 As a leading
environmental advocate explained, "IT]he environmental justice
movement is about trying to address all of the inequities that
result from human settlement, industrial facility siting and
industrial development." 10 Members of the movement seek to
assist minority and disadvantaged socio-economic communities
that receive a disproportionate share of toxic waste and other
health hazards."
Although some activism occurred during the 1960s and
1970s, 12 the national environmental justice movement fully
emerged in 1982 when a series of protests were staged in Warren
County, North Carolina, to prevent the siting of a
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) landfill in an overwhelmingly
low-income and minority community.13 In 1983, as a result of
the Warren County protests, the United States General
Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a study concerning the
problems of environmental injustice. 14 The study was conducted
in eight large southern states 5 and concluded that three out of
development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations,
and policies." COMM. ON ENVTL. JUSTICE, INST. OF MED., TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND HEALTH POLICY NEEDS, at Introduction and
Executive Summary (1999), available at http://www.nap.edu.
9 See Mattheisen, supra note 8, at 3.
10 Schweizer, supra note 3. "While the unfair distribution of locally undesirable
land uses (LULUs) is the issue most frequently raised by environmental justice
plaintiffs, there are other manifestations of environmental racism, including failure
to enforce clean air or clean water policies." Amanda C.L. Vig, Note, Using Title VI
to Salvage Civil Rights from Waste: Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living
v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 907, 910 n.28 (1999).
11 See Blank, supra note 3, at 1110.
12 See Graham & Grills, supra note 4, at 239.
13 Civil rights activists, government officials, religious leaders, and local
residents joined together to march. See Robert D. Bullard, Race and Environmental
Justice in the United States, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 328 (1993). These protests led
to the arrest of more than 500 people, and among those arrested were Dr. Benjamin
Chavis Jr., Executive Director of the United Church of Christ Commission for
Racial Justice; Dr. Joseph Lowery of the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference; and Walter Fauntry, congressman for the District of Columbia: Id.;
THURGOOD MARSHALL SCH. OF LAW, ENVTL. JUSTICE CLINIC, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE HISTORY (1996), available at http://www.tsulaw.edu.
14 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF
SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983) [hereinafter GAO Study]. This study was
reportedly conducted at the request of Congressman Walter Fauntry, who was
arrested at the protests. See Bullard, supra note 13, at 328.
15 See Bullard, supra note 13, at 328. The states that comprised EPA region IV
consisted of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina,
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every four landfills were located near predominantly minority
communities. 16
Several subsequent studies have heightened the concern for
environmental inequities and have added national exposure and
validity to the movement.17 Countless volumes of academic
discussion and suggested solutions have followed.' 8 In addition,
citizens trying to protect their communities from discriminatory
environmental practices have brought state and federal
lawsuits. 19 Executive validation of the movement's importance
South Carolina, and Tennessee. Id.
16 GAO Study, supra note 14, at 1-6.
17 See COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, Toxic
WASTES AND RACE IN THE U.S. (1987) (concluding that communities with greater
minority percentages of the population are more likely to be the sites of commercial
hazardous waste facilities); Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Unequal Protection:
The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S10
(indicating that it took the EPA twenty percent longer to place abandoned sites
located in minority communities on the national priority action list and that
polluters of those neighborhoods paid fifty-four percent fewer fines than polluters of
white communities); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, The Michigan Conference: A
Turning Point, 18 EPA J. 9, 10 (1992) (discussing the significance of the 1992
University of Michigan's Symposium on race poverty and the environment and its
findings that minorities bear a disproportionate burden of pollution in America
because their land is cheaper and because these communities tend to have little
political clout due to the residents' lack of time, money, organization, and political
knowledge). See generally Michele L. Knorr, Comment, Environmental Injustice:
Inequities Between Empirical Data and Federal, State Legislative and Judicial
Responses, 6 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 71 (1997).
18 See, e.g., Bullard, supra note 13; Sandra Geiger, An Alternative Legal Tool for
Pursuing Environmental Justice: The Takings Clause, 31 COLUM. J. L. & SOC.
PROBS. 201 (1998); Graham & Grills, supra note 4; Knorr, supra note 17; Lazarus,
supra note 5; Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI: Making
Recipient Agencies Justify Their Siting Decisions, 73 TUL. L. REV. 787 (1999); Janet
Siegal, Negotiating for Environmental Justice: Turning Polluters into "Good
Neighbors" Through Collaborative Bargaining, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 147 (2002);
Vig, supra note 10.
19 See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771,
775-76 (3d Cir. 2001) (alleging that cement facility in operation under air quality
permit issued by New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection would have
disparate impact on plaintiffs in violation of Title VI); New York City Envtl. Justice
Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 2000) (seeking to restrain city from
selling any one of 600 community gardens because it would have a disparate impact
on New York's minority communities); Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 559-60 (11th
Cir. 1996) (protesting building of waste landfill near minority community less than
three miles from existing one); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v.
Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 925, 937 (3d Cir. 1997),
vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998) (alleging that issuance of a permit to operate
facility in predominantly African-American community violated plaintiffs' civil
rights); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 675 (S.D. Tex.
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came in 1994 when President Clinton issued Executive Order
12,898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in
Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,20 to serve as
a guide to federal agencies promulgating environmental
regulations. 21 In addition to the Executive Order, President
Clinton wrote a companion memorandum which emphasized
that "[e]nvironmental and civil rights statutes provide many
opportunities to address environmental hazards in minority
communities and low-income communities." 22 Indeed, because
the environmental justice movement is so intertwined with civil
rights,23 many plaintiffs have sued under the Equal Protection
Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.24 In Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. ,25 however, the Supreme Court held that in order to prove
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause plaintiffs must prove
discriminatory intent or purpose.26 The Court listed five factors
that must be proven in order to find a violation:
(1) disproportionate impact, (2) the historical background of the
challenged decision, (3) the specific antecedent events, (4)
1979) (contending that the state department's decision to issue permit for waste
disposal facility was motivated by racial discrimination).
20 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859-60 (1994), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
21 Id. The order did not have the force of law nor could it be enforced if agencies
chose not to follow it. Id. It provides, in pertinent part:
To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law.., each Federal
agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by
identifying and addressing... disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on
minority populations and low-income populations in the United States....
Id. For a similar order issued by President Clinton six years later, see Executive
Order No. 13,148, Greening the Government Through Leadership in Environmental
Management, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 891 (Apr. 26, 2000).
22 William J. Clinton, Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc 279 (Feb. 11, 1994).
23 See supra notes 2-6, 17 and accompanying text.
24 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) (Title VI)
provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d 1994).
25 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
26 Id. at 264-65.
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departures from normal procedures, and (5) contemporary
statements of decision makers.27
II. THE RISE AND POSSIBLE FALL OF TITLE VI AS AN AVENUE OF
RELIEF FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE PLAINTIFFS
A. Title VI and Sandoval: How Did We Get Here?
The high burden of proof established by Arlington Heights
has been nearly insurmountable in the environmental justice
context.28 Due in large part to the failure of cases brought on
Equal Protection Clause grounds, scholars 29 and plaintiffs
seeking environmental justice had hoped that Title VI would be
a possible avenue of relief for their claims. 30 Then the Supreme
Court decided Alexander v. Sandoval.31 In the spring of 2001,
the Sandoval Court held that there is no private right of action
to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32 Although Sandoval was not
27 Id. at 265-68.
28 See Residents Involved in Saving the Env't (R.I.S.E.), Inc. v. Kay, 768 F.
Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991) (finding that, although the placement of
landfills in two minority communities disproportionately affected African-American
residents, the impact was not intentional and therefore did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause), affd mem., 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); E. Bibb Twiggs
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F.
Supp. 880, 886 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (allowing placement of a landfill in an African-
American community despite evidence of disparate impact because the plaintiff
failed to show that "race was a motivating factor"), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir.
1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-81 (S.D.
Tex. 1979) (finding that statistics upon which plaintiffs relied to show pattern of
racial discrimination in placement of waste facilities was not enough to prove
disparate impact or discriminatory intent); see also Knorr, supra note 17, at 105
("The burden of proving intentional discrimination is virtually impossible in
environmental injustice cases.").
29 For a detailed and optimistic discussion of Title VI's utility to environmental
justice plaintiffs, see Vig, supra note 10, at 920-34.
30 See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413
(E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 925, 937 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, 524 U.S.
974 (1998). The Third Circuit became the first court in the country to hold that
there is a private cause of action under Title VI. Seif, 132 F.3d at 936.
31 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
32 Id. at 293. This Note will not discuss whether or not there should be a
private cause of action under Title VI. For thorough discussions of this issue see
generally Fisher, supra note 6; Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause of Action
Under EPA's Title VI Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental Justice
Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1999); Mattheisen, supra note 8; Julia B.
Latham Worsham, Disparate Impact Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602: Can a
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an environmental justice suit,33 one can assume the broad
application of this decision.34 Plaintiffs alleging discriminatory
effects against state environmental agencies that receive
financial assistance from the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) will be limited to administrative
avenues because of the lack of a private cause of action under
Title VI.35
Prior to its decision in Sandoval, the Supreme Court
debated whether Title VI provided a right of action for
intentional discrimination alone or for discriminatory effects as
well.36  Initially, the Court held that discriminatory effect,
absent intent, is actionable.37 In a later decision, the Court
fragmented over the required standard of proof for a Title VI
violation. 38 In yet another decision, the Justices divided again
over the applicable standard. 39 It was not until Alexander v.
Choate,40 a case involving the Rehabilitation Act, that the
Supreme Court "provided a clear, unanimous statement"
regarding disparate impact and Title VI:41 "[W]hile Title VI
Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice? 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 631 (2000).
33 The case involved a suit against the Alabama Department of Public Safety as
a recipient of federal financial assistance and its policy of administering state
driver's license exams only in English. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 278-79. Respondent
Sandoval brought the suit to challenge this policy, arguing that it violated a DOJ
regulation "because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to
discrimination based on their national origin." Id. at 279.
34 See Avi Brisman, EPA's Disproportionate Impact Methodologies-RBA and
COATCEM--and the Draft Recipient Guidance and Draft Revised Investigation
Guidance in Light of Alexander v. Sandoval, 34 CoNN. L. REV. 1065, 1065 (2002).
35 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289 ("Section 602 empowers agencies to enforce
their regulations either by terminating funding to the 'particular program, or part
thereof,' that has violated the regulation or 'by any other means authorized by
law.' "); see also Brisman, supra note 34, at 1065.
36 See Mattheisen, supra note 8, at 10-12.
37 See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974) (finding a violation of Title
VI because an English language requirement for graduation had a disparate impact
on non-English-speaking Chinese students).
38 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978). Dicta
in Bakke suggested that Title VI violations require discriminatory intent. See id.
39 See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593 (1983). In
Guardians, the Court considered a written examination required for entry into the
police department and its disparate impact on the pass rates of blacks and
Hispanics as compared to whites. Id. at 585. The Court determined that although
this policy was facially neutral, proof of discriminatory effect was enough to
establish a Title VI violation. Id. at 593.
40 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
41 Mattheisen, supra note 8, at 11.
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itself prohibits only intentional discrimination, federal agencies
may ... prohibit unintentional discriminatory effects by
adopting a disparate impact standard in the regulations they
issue to implement Title VI."42 Until Sandoval, this statement
seemed promising for environmental justice plaintiffs.43 Justice
Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in Sandoval, stated that
there is no private right of action in federal court to enforce
disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI. 44
B. Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, Title VI, and § 1983
In the same year as Sandoval, an environmental justice suit
brought by neighborhood groups challenging the siting of a
cement facility in a minority neighborhood in South Camden,
New Jersey, was the source of three significant and intricate
Title VI decisions. 45 The neighborhood groups won the first two
decisions in district court against the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (NJDEP),46 complete with a finding
that a private right of action existed to enforce Title VI disparate
impact regulations through § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 47
42 See id.; see also Alexander, 469 U.S. at 292-94. Because the Rehabilitation
Act and Title VI are so similar, Alexander has been regarded as interpretive of Title
VI. Id. at 293 n.7 ("Section 504 was patterned after and is almost identical to, the
antidiscrimination language of § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964...." (quoting S.
REP. NO. 93-1297, at 39 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6390-91)).
43 See supra notes 29-30.
4 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285-86, 291 (2001) (rejecting Lau's
interpretation of § 601 as reaching beyond intentional discrimination and finding
that a private cause of action, not authorized by Congress, cannot be created by a
regulation).
45 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d
446, 450 (D.N.J. 2001) [hereinafter SCCIA 1], rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001)
[hereinafter SCCIA III], cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002); S. Camden Citizens in
Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001) [hereinafter
SCCIA II], rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002).
The first of the three cases was decided on April 19, 2001, which was only six days
before the Sandoval decision on April 24, 2001. See SCCIA 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
46 See SCCIA I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 497; SCCLA 11, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), which provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
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against recipients of the EPA's funding.48 Almost immediately
after Sandoval,49 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that
in light of Sandoval, there is no private right of action in federal
court to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations through
§ 1983.50 In South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection, the court held that an
administrative regulation could not create an enforceable
interest under § 1983 where the authorizing statute had created
none. 51 Accordingly, inasmuch as Title VI proscribed only
intentional discrimination, 52 the plaintiffs did not have an
enforceable right under § 1983 to challenge the EPA's disparate
impact discrimination regulations. 53
Although plaintiffs in Sandoval did not bring suit under
§ 1983,54 Justice Stevens did address the possibility of such a
suit in his impassioned dissent.55 He stated, "[T]o the extent
that the majority denies relief to the respondents merely because
they neglected to mention 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in framing their Title
VI claim, this case is something of a sport."56 He went on to
hypothesize that similarly situated plaintiffs in the future "must
only reference § 1983 to obtain relief."5 7 Despite how simple
Justice Stevens made this sound,58 cases and scholars have
disagreed over the possible success of proving a violation of
§ 1983.59 The reality remains that, without a private cause of
48 See SCCIA I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 497; SCCIA 11, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
49 Within hours after the Sandoval decision, Judge Orlofsky, who authored
SCCIA I, asked counsel to address the impact of Sandoval on the decision. See
Bradford C. Mank, South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection: Will Section 1983 Save Title VI Disparate Impact Suits?,
32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10454, 10455 (2002).
50 See SCCIA I1, 274 F.3d at 774.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001). Plaintiffs' claim was
brought only under Title VI. See id.
55 See id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined in the dissent. See id. at 293.
56 Id. at 299-300.
57 Id. at 300.
58 It is the author's belief that in his attempt to 'swipe' at the majority, Justice
Stevens may have oversimplified the reality of a successful suit under § 1983.
59 See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 403 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding "that a
§ 1983 suit is not incompatible with Title VI and the Title VI regulation"); Harless v.
Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding enough evidence to support a
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action under Title VI or a guarantee of success under § 1983,
environmental justice plaintiffs must look for new avenues to
obtain relief.
C. Administrative Suits and Federal Agency Review
Environmental justice plaintiffs have had and still have the
option of filing administrative complaints with the EPA. 60
Positive features of this avenue are its relative simplicity6' and
cost effectiveness. 62 Often, filing an administrative complaint is
enough to persuade a private permittee to relocate. 63 Proponents
of this avenue also contend that relief might be more easily
obtained through an agency than through decisions from the
Reagan- and Bush-appointed federal judiciary. 64 Some negative
aspects of the administrative option are that complainants do
not have the right to participate in the EPA's investigation, 65 to
present evidence or witnesses,66 or to be informed of the status of
§ 1983 claim in a Title VII claim); Mank, supra note 49, at 10456 (discussing § 1983
as a possible way to enforce Title VI regulations); cf. SCCIA III, 274 F.3d at 790
(concluding that "a federal regulation alone may not create a right enforceable
through § 1983 not already found in the enforcing statute"); Geiger, supra note 18,
at 212 (noting that scholars "unanimously agree" that" 'the high burdens in proving
discriminatory intent [in § 1983 suits] prevent meritorious consideration of
environmental justice issues' ") (citations omitted).
60 See Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering
Environmental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft Revised
Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits
(Draft Revised Investigation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650 (June 27, 2000). The
Draft Revised Guidance describes how the EPA will investigate and resolve formal
complaints. Id.
61 A person only has to write a letter to any EPA office alleging a
discriminatory action or effect by a funding recipient and the EPA assumes
responsibility from that point forward. See Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights,
Environmental Justice and the EPA: A Brief History of Administrative Complaints
Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9. J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 309, 314-15
(1994). The letter "must allege discrimination on the basis of either race, color or
national origin; and must identify the discriminatory program or activity receiving
the EPA assistance. The complaint should also describe the discriminatory action or
activity that spawned the complaint." Id. at 319 n.38 (citations omitted).
62 See id. at 321. A person or group wishing to file a complaint does not need to
hire a lawyer, and there is no filing fee. Id.
63 See Mank-, supra note 32, at 23.
64 See Fisher, supra note 6, at 315-16.
65 See Cole, supra note 61, at 321; Mank, supra note 32, at 23.
66 See Draft Recipient Guidance, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650, 39,672; see supra note 60.
Investigation of Title VI complaints is not an adversarial process between
complainant and recipient. Thus, there is no right of appeal. See id.
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their case.67 Another disadvantage of seeking an administrative
remedy is that the EPA has never concluded that a recipient was
in violation of Title VI.68  Essentially, the "EPA does not
represent the complainants, but rather the interests of the
Federal government, in ensuring nondiscrimination by its
recipients."69 Additionally, EPA administrators have limited
remedial authority70 and desire to punish funding recipients who
are noncompliant.7 1
In sum, due to the foreclosure of a private cause of action
under Title VI,72 the high burden of proof for a § 1983 suit,73 and
the limited remedial scheme for an administrative complaint,74
environmental justice plaintiffs may find these avenues
insufficient. It is time for environmental justice plaintiffs to be
creative and "win the justice game" through a series of base hits
instead of trying for the elusive grand slam.
III. USING THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY LAW TO ACHIEVE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
A. Legal Obligation and Duty Defined
As one of the most well-known contracts scholars 75
explained:
[T]he term "obligation"... has meant the entire group of jural
relations created by certain facts, usually expressions of
agreement .... [The narrowing of the term has made it) come
to be an almost exact synonym of the term 'legal duty'.... If a
67 Cole, supra note 61, at 323. (explaining that the informal nature of the
procedure makes it easy for complainants to "be shut out of the process").
68 See Worsham, supra note 32, at 664.
69 Draft Recipient Guidance, 65 Fed. Reg. at 39,672.
70 See Draft Revised Investigation Guidance, 65 Fed. Reg. at 39,669 ("The
primary administrative remedy described in the regulations involves the
termination of EPA assistance to the recipient.").
71 See id. ("EPA encourages the use of informal resolution to address Title VI
complaints whenever possible."). Other limits on the EPA's referrals to the
Department of Justice are discussed infra in Section IV.
72 See supra Section II.A.
73 See supra Section II.B.
74 See supra Section II.C.
75 Arthur Linton Corbin (1874-1966). A long-standing member of the Yale Law
School faculty, Corbin wrote various treatises and law review articles regarding
contract law.
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duty (obligation) exists, it is a duty to some person who has a
right against the one subject to the duty.76
The law of contracts attempts "the realization of every
expectation that has been induced by... [the making of] a
promise."77 Indeed, as one of the most influential law review
articles ever written explained, one of the chief rationales for
protecting the reasonable expectations of parties is to facilitate
reliance on agreements. 78
B. The Recognition of Third Party Rights
In 1859, the New York Court of Appeals in Lawrence v. Fox
defied the prevailing rules of contractual liability by holding that
a third party to a contract who had no obligation under it could,
nevertheless, enforce it. 79 As the case law has evolved in this
country,80  this rule has been adopted in almost every
jurisdiction,8' and it is generally accepted that an action may be
maintained on a contract by one who had no part in creating it.82
A party is a third party beneficiary8 3 if the contract
manifests the parties' intentions to confer upon him the benefit
of the promised performance.8 4 This manifestation creates a
76 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (1993).
77 Id. ("[Tihis is not the only purpose... but it is believed to be the main
underlying purpose.").
78 See Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 59-62 (1936); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("A promise is a manifestation
of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a
promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made."). See generally
Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Anderson, The World of a Contract, 75 IOWA L. REV. 861
(1990).
79 See Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third
Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1985).
80 See, e.g., Septembertide Pubrg, B.V. v. Stein & Day, Inc., 884 F.2d 675 (2d
Cir. 1989); Grigerik v. Sharpe, 721 A.2d 526 (Conn. 1998); Bay v. Williams, 1 N.E.
340 (Ill. 1884); Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918).
81 See Waters, supra note 79, at 1111-12. In a number of states the obligation
of a promisor to a third party beneficiary is founded on general legislation. See, e.g.,
W MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1405 (2002); W. VA. CODE § 55-8-12 (2002).
82 See CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 857 (E. Allan Farnsworth et al. eds.,
6th ed. 2001) [hereinafter CONTRACTS].
83 A third party beneficiary is also known as an 'intended beneficiary' as
opposed to an 'incidental beneficiary' who has no rights under the contract. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 302 (1), (2) (Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries).
84 See Orna S. Paglin, Criteria for Recognition of Third Party Beneficiary
Rights, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 63, 70 (1989); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 78,
§§ 302, 304, 308.
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duty in the promisor to perform the promise, and the intended
beneficiary may enforce that duty.8 5 The intended beneficiary
need not be specifically identified 6 but must be a person or in a
class of persons clearly intended to be benefited by the contract.8 7
Generally, a third party beneficiary is entitled to the same rights
and remedies as the contracting parties.88 As one scholar noted,
"This non-consensual liability is usually based on considerations
of justice and efficiency."8 9 The next section will explore how this
rule may be used to protect the intended beneficiaries of public
environmental programs in which there are EPA funding
contracts.
C. Application to Environmental Justice Plaintiffs
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, color, or national origin in programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance. 90 The statute
also authorizes each federal department and agency to effectuate
the provisions of the title by issuing regulations consistent with
achieving the objectives of the statute.91 The EPA's regulations
85 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 304.
86 See id. § 308 (Identification of Intended Beneficiaries) ("It is not essential to
the creation of a right in an intended beneficiary that he be identified when a
contract containing the promise is made.").
87 See Montana v. United States, 124 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The
intended beneficiary need not be specifically or individually identified in the
contract, but must fall within a class clearly intended to be benefited thereby.");
RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 302(1)(b).
88 See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Iridium Africa Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 120,
139-40 (D. Del. 2002) ("In some narrow circumstances a third party beneficiary may
seek rescission of a contract although it was not a principal party to the
contract.... [A] third party beneficiary is not entitled to rights greater than those of
the contracting parties."). Contract remedies include: specific performance,
expectation (compensatory) damages, reliance damages, restitution, and
consequential damages. See CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at 451; see also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 307 (Remedy of Specific Performance) ("Where
specific performance is another appropriate remedy, either the promise or the
beneficiary may maintain a suit for specific performance of a duty owed to an
intended beneficiary.").
89 Paglin, supra note 84, at 64.
90 See supra note 24.
91 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000), states:
Each Federal Department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant
loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d (§
601) of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules,
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under Title V192 explicitly codify the disparate impact, or
discriminatory effect, standard. 93 Under these regulations, if
there is discriminatory impact, then arguably it is the means by
which the program is administered that produced the impact.
In order for a funding recipient,94 typically a state or local
agency,95 to receive assistance, 96 it must first fill out an
application 97 along with an assurance stating that, with respect
to its programs or activities that receive EPA assistance, it will
comply with the requirements of the governing regulations. 98
After being approved for funding, each "Assistance Agreement
Recipient" receives a congratulatory letter which states: "As a
reminder, this assistance agreement is a legal document between
EPA and your organization... you are required to comply with
all applicable provisions of 40 CFR Chapter 1, Subchapter
B.. . ."99 This particular provision prohibits discrimination and
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent
with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial
assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 200d (1994)).
92 See 40 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2002).
93 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) states:
A recipient [of federal funds] shall not use criteria or methods of
administering its program which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex, or have
the effect of substantially defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the program with respect to
individuals of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex.
Id. (emphasis added).
94 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.25 (2002):
Recipient means, for the purposes of this regulation... any
instrumentality of a State or its political subdivision, any public or private
agency, institution, organization, or other entity, or any person to which
Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another
recipient, including any successor, assignee, or transferee of a recipient,
but excluding the ultimate beneficiary of the assistance.
Id.
95 See Cole, supra note 61, at 314.
96 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.25, which states:
EPA assistance means any grant or cooperative agreement, loan, contract
(other than a procurement contract or a contract of insurance or guaranty),
or any other arrangement by which EPA provides or otherwise makes
available assistance in the form of: 1) Funds; (2) Services of personnel; or
(3) Real or personal property or any interest in or use of such property.
Id.
97 Applications available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.omb/grants/sf424.pdf
(last visited January 30, 2003).
98 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.80(a) (2002).
99 Congratulatory letter, available at http://www.epa.gov/ro2earth/cgp/grid3l.
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discriminatory effects on the basis of race, color, national origin,
or sex.100
As Justice Scalia once explained, federal-state funding
agreements are "in the nature of a contract."1 1 When the state
promises to provide certain services for which the federal
government promises to give the state funds, the person who
receives the benefit of the exchange of promises between the two
is a third party beneficiary. 10 2 He went on to explain that, within
the context of federal-state contracts, he was willing to leave
open the possibility of a third party beneficiary action because
the issue had not been raised. 0 3
1. Validity of the EPA Regulations
The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the validity of the
EPA's regulations and their "effects" standard. 0 4 The Court has
found that the regulations "do more than merely prohibit grant
recipients from administering the funds with a discriminatory
purpose; they require recipients to administer the grants in a
manner that has no racially discriminatory effects." 05
Interestingly, the Court reiterated this presumption of validity
in Sandoval, stating that "regulations promulgated under
§ 602... may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate
impact on racial groups, even though such activities are
permissible under § 601. ' 106
2. Minorities as Intended Beneficiaries; the Creation of
Enforceable Rights
Although contract law does not require that the intended
beneficiary be identified, 10 7 the language of the EPA regulations
pdf.
100 40 C.F.R. pts. 30-49 (2002).
101 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
102 See id.
103 See id. at 350.
lO4 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001); Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1983); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568
(1974); see also SCCIA III, 274 F.3d 771, 790 (3d Cir. 2001); Chester Residents
Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated as
moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998).
105 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 642 (citing Lau, 414 U.S. at 568).
106 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281.
107 See supra note 86.
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clearly identifies the people intended to be benefited or
protected-minorities and people of color. 08 Because funding
recipients are not able to actively discriminate against these
groups, these groups are arguably intended to receive the benefit
of not being adversely affected by the discriminatory siting or
operation of facilities.
3. Enforceability of Third Party Beneficiary Rights
Once a beneficiary is intended under the third party rule, its
rights are as enforceable as though it were a party to the original
contract. 10 9 When state or local agencies receive federal financial
assistance from the EPA, it must agree to comply with the
"discriminatory effects" standard of EPA's regulations, 110 thereby
making minorities the intended beneficiaries of the funding
contracts. Accordingly, if facilities are not being sited or
operated in a way that avoids 'discriminatory effects,"" as third
party beneficiaries, the minority communities located near the
facilities should have a legal right to enforce the contract
between the state or local agency and the EPA.
This third party beneficiary right was recognized in an early
civil rights case in Louisiana. 112 Plaintiff school children in a
parish school district, though unnamed and undetermined, 113
were recognized to have the right as third party beneficiaries 114
to enforce the stipulation in the contract between the parish
108 Although the regulations specifically describe discriminatory effects on the
basis of sex, this Note will focus on the discriminatory effects on the basis of race,
color, and national origin.
109 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
111 See Mattheisen, supra note 8, at 34.
Although environmental permitting per se has no effect on the distribution
of facilities, particular standards and practices used to issue permits
may...[Tlhe disparate impact rule may be violated where a particular
standard or practice used in issuing environmental permits causes
facilities to be located in proximity to particular populations [or] if the
standard or practice is not programmatically justified, and there is no
feasible, comparably effective alternative that has a less disproportionate
effect.
Id.
112 Lemon v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. La. 1965), af/'d,
370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967). For a detailed discussion of this and other third party
recognition cases, see Waters, supra note 79, at 1183-92.
113 See Lemon, 370 F.2d at 849-50.
114 See Lemon, 240 F. Supp. at 713-14.
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school board and the United States government which required
that federal money be used to build schools in a non-
discriminatory way. 115  The district court held that these
contracts rendered plaintiffs members of the "class consisting of
all Negro children eligible to attend Bossier Parish Schools,"" 6
and both the district court and the Fifth Circuit held that
plaintiffs had a cause of action as third party beneficiaries of the
funding contract. 117
Similarly, this third party right was upheld in a case
brought by a resident in a nursing home against the home's
owner and operator." 8 The resident alleged that the home was
planning to discharge or transfer her for "other than medical
reasons" which would have violated Medicaid regulations. 119 The
home's owner had agreed to abide by the state's conditions and
Medicaid regulations 20 in order for the state to receive federal
funds.' 2 ' Plaintiff was held to be entitled to enforce the Medicaid
regulations as a third party beneficiary122 of the "provider's
agreement" between the nursing home operator and the state. 123
This case has particular relevance to environmental justice
plaintiffs. As one scholar noted, this case is "an excellent
example of the way in which plaintiffs can use the third party
beneficiary rule to secure the private benefits of a public
program in the absence of a private right to enforce the statute
itself." 24 Indeed, plaintiffs have successfully used the third
115 See id. at 713. The contracts provided that the "school facilities" built with
the federal money were to be made available to plaintiff children "on the same
terms, in accordance with the laws of the State in which Applicant is situated, as
they are available to other children in Applicant's school district." Id.
116 Id. at 714.
117 See Lemon, 370 F.2d at 850; Lemon, 240 F. Supp. at 713. The plaintiffs only
sought injunctive relief. Id. at 711.
118 See Fuzie v. Manor Care, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 689, 689-90 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
119 Id. at 692.
120 See id. at 693.
121 Id. at 697-98.
122 Id. at 701.
123 Id. at 697-98.
124 Waters, supra note 79, at 1187. This case has additional relevance because
government funded nursing homes are not the "State" for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003-05 (1982) (holding that the fact
that a private nursing home is "subject to state regulation does not by itself convert
its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment"). The
third party beneficiary alternative provides plaintiffs with an opportunity to prove
liability where they may not have been able to previously. See Fuzie, 461 F. Supp. at
697-98.
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party beneficiary rule in the context of education,125 health
care, 126 public welfare, 27 and housing. 128 Since there may no
longer be a private cause of action under Title VI,129
environmental justice plaintiffs still have the contract governed
by the EPA regulations on which to sue, to force compliance by
violating facilities, and to be awarded equitable and
compensatory damages. 130
D. Remedies for Minorities as Third Party Beneficiaries
There are two fundamental assumptions courts make in
enforcing promises.131 The first assumption is that the law is
concerned with redressing the breach and not with punishing the
breaching party.132 The second assumption is that the relief
granted should protect the nonbreaching party's expectation
interest by putting that party in the position it would have been
had the contract been performed. 33 In the cases discussed thus
far in support of the third party beneficiary rule, 34 the plaintiffs
were seeking either injunctive relief 35 or restitution 36  This
125 See Lemon v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. La. 1965),
aff'd, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967).
126 See Jackie Huchenski & Linda Abdel-Malek, HIPAA's Lack of Private Right
to Sue Not a Total Bar, NAT'L L.J., June 19, 2000, at B20.
127 See Fuzie, 461 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ohio 1977); cf Hodges v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 728 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1984) (reasoning that plaintiff
could not maintain a third party beneficiary action under federal contracts made
pursuant to § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because this theory was "but
another aspect of the implied right of action argument").
128 See Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1261 (7th Cir. 1981) (tenants sued as
third party beneficiaries of contract between United States Department of Housing
Urban Development (HUD) and landlords); Zigas v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App.
3d 827, 831 (Cal. App. Dep't Superior Ct. 1981) (same).
129 See infra Part II.A.
130 See infra Section III.D.
131 See CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at 1.
132 Id.; see also United States Naval Inst. v. Charter Communications, Inc., 936
F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[T~he purpose of damages for breach of contract is to
compensate the injured party for the loss caused by the breach."); cf Vernon Fire &
Cas. Ins. Corp. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173, 185 (Ind. 1976) (allowing punitive
damages in the insurer/insured context where plaintiff could prove defendants
behaved tortiously).
133 See CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at 1-2; see also Conagra, Inc. v. Nierenberg,
7 P.3d 369, 385 (Mont. 2000) (holding that appellant was entitled to expectation
damages that would measure what he would have made if his product had been sold
as promised).
134 See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
135 See Lemon v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F. Supp. 709, 711 (W.D. La.
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section explains why environmental justice plaintiffs should be
entitled to these two types of relief as well as the full range of
contract remedies.
1. Specific Performance/Injunction
The most direct form of equitable relief for breach of contract
is specific performance. 3 7 By ordering the promisor to render the
promised performance, the court attempts to produce the same
effect as if the contract had been performed. 138 Within the
environmental justice context, specific performance could come
in the form of a court order requiring the funding recipient to
comply with the "discriminatory effects" standard of the EPA
regulations that bind the recipient's funding contract. 139 For
example, in South Camden Citizens in Action (SCCIA) v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP),140 a
community organization in a minority neighborhood sued the
state environmental protection agency and its commissioner
claiming that the state agency's decision to issue an air pollution
permit for a cement processing facility would have a racially
discriminatory impact.' 4 ' Had SCCIA sued as a third party
beneficiary under the funding contract between the EPA and
NJDEP, it would have had to prove that this siting would have
"discriminatory effects" on the surrounding neighborhood in
order to show a breach of that contract. If the court saw fit to
grant specific performance as a remedy, 142 NJDEP would have
1965), affd, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967).
136 See Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1263 (7th Cir. 1981).
137 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.5 (2d ed. 2001)
[hereinafter FARNSWORTH]. A party to a contract has the right to demand specific
performance. See CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at 451-52. A court may order specific
performance instead of, or in addition to, a judgment for money damages if the
contract can still be performed and money cannot sufficiently compensate the
plaintiff. Id. A court may decline to order specific performance of a contract if
"damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured
party." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 359.
138 See CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at 451.
139 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 307 ("Where specific performance is
otherwise an appropriate remedy, either the promisee or the beneficiary may
maintain a suit for specific performance of a duty owed to an intended beneficiary.");
see also supra note 96.
140 SCCIA I, 145 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 2001).
141 Id.
142 See CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at 452 ("[Elquitable relief is discretionary.").
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had to rescind the permit granted to the facility and re-issue it in
such a way as to avoid these "discriminatory effects."143
An alternative to specific performance may be an
injunction 44 through which the court directs the party to refrain
from doing a specified act.145 This remedy is granted most often
in cases in which specific performance may be difficult to
supervise or "objectionable on some ground."146 Under the facts
of South Camden, an injunction could have stopped the siting of
the cement facility 147 or stopped continued construction or
operation of the facility if it was being operated in violation of
the "discriminatory effects" standards of the EPA regulations.
2. Expectation Damages
Along with any equitable relief, a court may also award
money damages. 148 One type of money damages is expectation
damages. 149 The amount of an expectancy award is measured by
the promisee's expectation interest' 50 in an attempt to put the
promisee in the position in which he would have been had the
contract been performed, in other words, give the promisee "the
benefit of his bargain."151 The expectation interest is based on
the actual value that the contract would have had to the injured
party had it been performed, 152 rather than on the hopes of the
injured party at the time the contract was created.153
143 See SCCIA I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
144 This is different from a preliminary injunction, which will be covered below
in Part IV.
145 See CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at 453 ("A court will not, however, grant an
injunction unless the remedy in damages would be inadequate.").
146 FARNSWORTH, supra note 137, § 12.5.
147 SCCIA 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
148 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 137, § 12.5; see also Gildow v. Smith, 957 P.2d
199, 201 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (citing an Oregon statute that allows for money
damages, specific performance, or both).
149 See CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at 1-2.
150 Id.
151 RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 344(a); see CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at
469 (Measuring Expectation).
152 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 140, § 12.1.
153 Section 347(b) of the restatement includes consequential and incidental
damages that occur as result of the breach in the calculation of expectation interest.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 347 (Measure of Damages in General); see also
Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 145 (1845) (describing consequential
damages as those that "may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising
naturally.., from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made
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In New York City Environmental Justice Alliance (NYCEJA)
v. Giuliani,54 plaintiffs sought to restrain New York City from
transferring or bulldozing the 1,100 city-owned parcels
comprising nearly 600 community gardens on the grounds that
any such sale or changed use of the parcels would have a
disproportionately adverse impact on the city's minority
residents 55 in violation of the EPA's regulations. 15 6  The
plaintiffs also asserted that because the city had accepted more
than $9,000,000 in federal grants to assist residents in creating
and maintaining gardens on these parcels, any proposed sale or
change would constitute a violation of the grant agreement. 57
Had the city performed its duty with the $9,000,000 grant,158 the
plaintiffs could have reasonably expected the money to be used
to assist them in creating and maintaining gardens on the
parcels of land.159 Plaintiffs alleged that the city breached its
promise by attempting to sell these parcels of land instead of
cultivating them.160 As successful third party beneficiaries to the
contract granting the funds, 161 plaintiffs would be entitled to the
money earmarked for maintenance and cultivation of the land162
the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it").
154 214 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2000).
155 For the purposes of this Note the word "minority" will be used. The specific
groups named in the suit were the city's African-American, Asian-American, and
Hispanic residents. See id. at 67.
156 See id. The plaintiffs also asserted violations of the regulations promulgated
under the Housing and Community Development Act (HCDA), 14 U.S.C. § 1437
(2000). Id.
157 Id. The grants were received from the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development, which is not governed by the EPA regulations at issue. Id.
For the purpose of discussing "expectation damages," however, the theoretical
underpinning is the same.
158 See id. (alleging that the city did not use the money as promised).
159 Id. This, in fact, was what plaintiffs did expect. Id.
160 Id.
161 Plaintiffs failed in NYCEJA because they used non-scientific measures to
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. See id. at 69-72. Plaintiffs' use of
destroying "open space" as the criteria for determining disparate impact, based on
plaintiffs' limited definition, did not meaningfully measure the impact of
defendants' actions on minority communities compared with the impact on non-
minority communities. The plaintiffs would bear the same burden to prove
discriminatory effects in a meaningful way if they were to prove breach of the
contract governed by EPA regulations. See id.
162 This is plaintiffs' expectation interest. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 137,
§ 12.1.
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and any incidental and consequential damages that flowed
naturally from the city's breach.163
3. Reliance Damages
A court may grant reliance damages if the promisee has
changed its position to its detriment in reliance on the
promise. 164 The third party beneficiary may, for example, have
incurred expenses in reliance on performance 165 or have lost
opportunities to make other contracts. 166  The third party
beneficiary's injury consists of being worse off than if the
promise had not been made. 67 "The law might protect this
interest by putting the plaintiff back in the position in which it
would have been had the promise not been made."168
In Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif,169
plaintiff city residents and a non-profit public interest
corporation sued the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection and funding recipients, alleging
violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Federal EPA's
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto in connection with the
163 See supra note 137.
164 See CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at 14; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 78,
§ 349 (Damages Based on Reliance Interest) ("[Tihe injured party has a right to
damages based on his reliance interest, including expenditures made in preparation
for performance or in performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove
with reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract
been performed."). Farnsworth distinguished between "essential reliance," reliance
that consists of preparation for and performance of contract in question, and
"incidental reliance," preparation for collateral transactions that a party plans to
carry out when the contract in question is performed. FARNSWORTH, supra note 137,
§ 12.1. For the purposes of this Note, both types will be included in the general
heading of "reliance."
165 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 349.
166 See id.; see also Fuller & Perdue, supra note 78, at 74 (indicating that if lost
opportunities are counted, the connection between expectation damages and
reliance damages will depend "upon the extent to which other opportunities of a
similar nature were open to the plaintiff").
167 See CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at 14.
168 Id. Measuring damages by the reliance interest is supposed to pose fewer
problems of causation than measuring expectation in the case of out-of-pocket
losses. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 137, § 12.1. One scholar has argued that
reliance "provides the smallest imaginable recovery short of refusing to enforce the
promise at all. In fact, it provides a level of recovery smaller than the recovery
dictated by the strongest case for enforcing a contract." Michael B. Kelly, The
Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1755, 1775-76.
169 944 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1996) [Seif I], rev'd, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997)
[Seif IlU, vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998).
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process employed for the issuance of permits for construction of
waste facilities. 170 The City of Chester had a population that
was 86.5% white and 11.2% black with the highest concentration
of industrial facilities located within the African-American
portion of the city. 17 1  Plaintiffs argued that the process
defendants used to determine whether to grant a waste facility
permit had discriminatory effects, concentrating the burden of
pollution and its consequent negative health effects within the
African-American community of Chester while leaving the white
section virtually pollution free. 172 The trial court in Seif granted
defendants' motion to dismiss and held that there was no private
right of action under the EPA regulations. 173
If plaintiffs had been successful third party beneficiaries 174
to the federal funding contract and were awarded reliance
damages, the damages could have been measured by the cost to
Chester residents of moving into or staying in the affected
neighborhood. For example, while minority residents relied on
the nondiscriminatory execution of the permit issuance process,
they bought or occupied homes in Chester. 175 Meanwhile, waste
facility permits were being issued in a way that would have
discriminatory effects and dangerous health effects on their
communities, 176 in breach of the EPA regulations that bind the
funding contracts. 177 In order to put the residents back in their
pre-contract position, the state agency issuing permits should
reimburse them for what it cost them to buy and maintain their
homes.178
170 See id. at 414. In particular, at issue was the grant of a waste facility permit
to Soil Remediation Services, Inc., to open such a facility in the City of Chester in
addition to the many facilities already there. Id.
171 Id. at 414-15.
172 Id. at 415. For a detailed analysis of the census statistics, see Wesley D.
Few, The Wake of Discriminatory Intent and the Rise of Title VI in Environmental
Justice Lawsuits, 6 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 110-12 (1997).
173 Seif 1, 944 F. Supp. at 417-18.
174 Plaintiffs were not successful in district court but did prevail in the Third
Circuit on their original claims. See id. at 418; Seif 11, 132 F.3d at 937.
175 See Seif I, 944 F. Supp. at 415.
176 Id. ("Of all the cities of [Pennsylvania], Chester has the highest infant
mortality rate.., and the highest death rate due to certain malignant tumors.").
The heightened toxicity was a result of the number of plants and their close
proximity to low income, minority residential neighborhoods.
177 See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
178 Supra note 164. For a detailed discussion of how a court calculates reliance
damages, see Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186-90 (Mass. 1973).
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Another measure of reliance damages is "opportunities
lost."1 79 For example, Chester residents relied on the agency to
administer federal funds in a nondiscriminatory way, 80 and they
may not have protested this particular agency's siting decisions
earlier in the process or moved out of Chester in the hopes that
all parties to the agreement would comply. After the dangerous
and discriminatory siting decisions became clear, Chester
residents had essentially lost the opportunity to either protest
the original grant of federal funds or become more active earlier
in the siting process, for which courts may attach a monetary
value. 181 Additionally, Chester residents might have stayed in
their homes awaiting compliance. Even if residents did choose to
move after the disclosure of the discriminatory siting process,8 2
there would certainly be a marked decrease in the value of their
homes in light of the dangers inherent in their neighborhood
which can also be quantified in damages. 183
4. Restitution
Perhaps the remedy best suited to third party claims dealing
with intended benefits of "public"18 4 programs is restitution. 185
179 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 137, § 12.6a ("Although opportunity costs have
received increasing attention in scholarly writings, they have been largely ignored
by courts. There are, nonetheless, situations in which it is appropriate to count lost
opportunities in reliance damages."); see also Grouse v. Group Health Plan Inc., 306
N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981) (holding that plaintiff was due reliance damages
because of lost employment opportunity). The author maintains that Seif presented
an appropriate situation for an opportunity cost award.
180 See SeifI, 944 F. Supp. at 415.
181 See Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116.
182 See SeifI, 944 F. Supp. at 415.
183 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 137, § 12.16a:
[I]n some cases the pronisee will not be able to show that another
opportunity was available when the promise was made, or that he knew of
and would have seized the opportunity if one was available, in others the
promisee can overcome these obstacles and should be allowed to count lost
opportunities.
Id.
Based on this line of reasoning, if residents can show they would have moved
but for their belief in compliance and that there was a difference in the price offered
before the siting and after, plaintiffs' reliance damages should factor in this
difference.
184 These programs are not public in the way 'public utilities' such as electricity
and water are public and available to the population as a whole. See Koch v. Consol.
Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 559, 468 N.E.2d 1, 7, 479 N.Y.S. 2d 163, 559 (1984)
(finding that residents of City of New York were precisely the consumers for whom
contract was made between city agency and Con Edison); CORBIN, supra note 76,
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"The promisee has a restitution interest if it has not only relied
on the promise but has conferred a benefit on the promisor."18 6
This interest will be protected by "putting the promisor back in
the position in which it would have been had the promise not
been made."18 7 As one scholar noted:
When a link in the chain of distribution of new property
rights-a school board, a nursing home operator, or a
landlord-has received federal funds to be spent for the benefit
of an identifiable group, there is a benefit conferred. When the
promisor fails to distribute the promised benefits, he is unjustly
enriched by reason of an infringement of another person's
interest.188
Applying the theory of new property rights and unjust
enrichment in public programs 8 9 to the facts of SCCIA,
explained in Part III.D.1, the result could have been much better
for the residents of South Camden. 190 Had they sued as third
party beneficiaries' 91 to the federal-state funding contracts 192
and been granted restitution damages, they would have been
entitled to compensation. 193 For example, NJDEP received
federal funds in return for its compliance with the
discriminatory effects standard of the EPA regulations which,
§ 805 (Contracts with a Municipality for the Benefit of the Inhabitants). But see
H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 165, 159 N.E. 896, 898 (1928)
(holding that contract between a city and a water company to furnish water at the
city hydrants benefits the public incidentally, not immediately; therefore, plaintiff
could not recover under third party beneficiary rule). These programs are public to a
specifically defined class of third parties based on geographical placement of
facilities. See Waters, supra note 79, at 1204.
185 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 370 ("A party is entitled to
restitution.., to the extent that he has conferred a benefit on the other party by
way of part performance or reliance."); see also id. § 371 (Measure of Restitution
Interest).
186 CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at 15; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 78,
§ 370.
187 CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at 15.
188 Waters, supra note 79, at 1209; see generally Charles A. Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
189 Waters, supra note 79, at 1207.
190 See SCCIA III, 274 F.3d 771, 791 (2d Cir. 2001). The district court's order
granting preliminary injunction and injunctive relief was reversed and remanded.
Id.
191 Plaintiffs tried to enforce EPA regulations under § 1983. SCCIA III, 274
F.3d at 774.
192 NJDEP received federal money. Id. This had to be the case in order for them
to have an action under § 602. See supra part III.C.
193 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 371.
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according to the above posited theory,194 is a benefit conferred on
the identifiable group of minority residents. 195 When NJDEP
failed to administer these funds so as to avoid discriminatory
effects, it was unjustly enriched by infringing on the residents'
property interest in the promise. 196 NJDEP, therefore, owes
restitution to the residents in the manner and amount necessary
to prevent unjust enrichment 197 or as justice may require. 198
As this section has made clear, environmental justice
plaintiffs may often be better off, both monetarily and in their
burden of proof, to sue as third party beneficiaries to the federal-
state funding contracts of the EPA. Although this theory will
not yield a sweeping policy decision or civil rights verdict per se,
broad decisions are only one way to achieve justice. It can
perhaps be more effective to steadily chip away at the very basis
of why facilities are where they are in the first place-money.
The next part provides a brief overview of two additional types of
relief that have been and continue to be available to
environmental justice plaintiffs.
IV. THE CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS, CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, AND PARALLEL
PROCEEDINGS
Environmental enforcement in the United States is an
extraordinarily complex matter. 199 Enforcement can come in the
form of civil actions for the imposition of a penalties 200 or
injunctive relief,201 or it can take the form of criminal
prosecutions 20 2 that result in heavy fines for corporations 20 3 and
194 See Waters, supra note 79, at 1209.
195 See id.
196 Id.
197 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Tent. Draft. No. 1, 1983).
198 Waters, supra note 79, at 1209.
199 DANIEL RIESEL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
§ 1.01 (2002).
200 See Clean Water Act (CWA) § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2000). In addition
to civil penalties imposed by courts, the EPA often has authority to assess penalties
through a statutorily mandated administrative process using the same criteria as is
applied to other civil penalties. See, e.g., id. § 309(g)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3). The
EPA's penalties are not binding on the courts once the case develops beyond
settlement negotiations, but the hope is that courts will apply them in their
consideration of the size of the judicial penalty. RIESEL, supra note 199, § 4.03
(Statutory Criteria).
201 RIESEL, supra note 199, § 1.01.
202 See Daniel Riesel, Corporate and Individual Criminal Liability Arising from
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prison sentences for individuals. 2 4  Because a detailed
discussion of these two topics could each be the subject of a
separate article, each will be covered briefly in this section as
useful alternatives for environmental justice plaintiffs. It is also
important to note that the major national environmental
statutes2 5 and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 20 6 together
afford substantial discretion to the EPA,20 7 the Department of
Justice (DOJ), 208 and the courts20 9 to create remedies for
environmental violations, including combinations of criminal,
civil, and administrative sanctions. 210
Environmental Crimes, C352 ALI-ABA 281 (1988); Steven A. Herman,
Administration Submits Legislation Which Provides New Tools to Protect the Public
from Environmental Crimes, NATL ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Oct. 1996, at 19.
203 See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a),
(c), (h) (2000) (discussing administrative penalty of up to $25,000 per day for
violation of compliance order or other requirement); § 6928(d) (criminal penalties).
204 See Riesel, supra note 202, at 300 ("Individuals can become liable for crimes
committed by a corporation."); see also The Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)
(2000). The CAA's criminal provisions have been strengthened to include maximum
felony penalties of up to five years imprisonment. The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) (also known
as the SUPERFUND) carries a penalty of up to three years imprisonment. Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the offense of "knowing endangerment resulting
from mishandling hazardous or toxic substances, pesticides, or other pollutants
brings a mandatory sentence of fifty-one to sixty-three months in prison without the
possibility of parole.
205 See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928
(2000); Clean Water Act (CWA), 42 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413
(2000).
206 See RIESEL, supra note 199, § 1.07 n.4 (discussing the Federal Sentencing
Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 991). The statute provides that if Congress does not act on
the Commission's recommended sentences, they automatically become law and are
binding on federal judges for the crimes covered by the Guidelines. One of the few
areas of regulatory crime the Commission has dealt with is in environmental
regulation. Id.
207 See RIESEL, supra note 199, § 1.05A (Agency Decisions and Rule Making).
208 See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES: FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF
SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR
(July 1, 1991).
209 Courts, however, will largely apply judicial deference to agency decisions
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. See
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-46 (1984).
A court may not substitute its own interpretation for that of the administrator of an
agency. Id.
210 See Kevin A. Gaynor & Thomas R. Bartman, Criminal Enforcement of
Environmental Laws, 10 ENVTL. LITIG. 297, 298 (1999) (explaining how
environmental statutes authorize both civil and criminal enforcement actions for
the same violations of their provisions through "parallel proceedings").
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A. Preliminary Injunctions
In many environmental justice cases, plaintiffs have sought
a preliminary injunction at the outset of the suit. 211  A
preliminary injunction is intended to preserve the status quo
and prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff during the course
of litigation by prohibiting the defendant from doing the act
which is in dispute. 212 This device is particularly helpful to
environmental justice plaintiffs because, while the suit is
pending or in the process of being litigated, they will not incur
additional losses or heightened toxicity to their neighborhood
before final adjudication on the merits.
The four factors courts consider in determining whether a
preliminary injunction should be granted are "(1) the probability
of plaintiffs' success on the merits, (2) irreparable nature of harm
to the plaintiff(s), (3) the balance of hardships between the
parties, and (4) in environmental cases, the public interest."213
As one court noted, "The four considerations applicable to
preliminary injunction decisions are factors to be balanced, not
prerequisites that must be met."214 Indeed, the various circuits
have applied the standards for granting a preliminary injunction
differently and have been more likely to grant one in certain
types of pollution cases than in others. 215 Despite this tendency,
however, a past record of environmental violations by a
defendant may predispose a court to find that irreparable harm
is likely.216 Although not a permanent answer to the problem of
211 See, e.g., Rozar v. Mulis, 85 F.3d 556 (11th Cir. 1996); Lucero v. Detroit
Pub. Sch., 160 F. Supp. 2d 767 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Bean v. Southwestern Waste
Mgmt., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
212 See Lucero, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 779.
213 See RIESEL, supra note 199, § 5.03.
214 Id.; see Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987)
(concluding that when environmental harm is "sufficiently likely, therefore the
balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the
environment").
215 See RIESEL, supra note 199, § 5.03. Riesel points out that it may be more
difficult to demonstrate irreparable injury in air and water pollution cases because
'a penalty is tantamount to shutting down an industrial polluter." Id. However,
"when a plaintiff seeks to obtain speedy compliance with a permit for a state
implementation plan which does not require the drastic economic dislocations
associated with the shutting down of industrial facilities, he or she will have an
easier time demonstrating irreparable injury." Id.
216 Id. (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Texaco, Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 506 (3d Cir.
1993) in which the court held that the decade-long history of substantial non-
compliance at Texaco's refinery helped demonstrate irreparable injury to plaintiffs).
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environmental racism, the availability of preliminary injunctions
may enable environmental justice plaintiffs to reduce the
cumulative effects of discriminatory siting and operation of
facilities 217 while they litigate the suit. Assuming success on the
merits, this can lead to a substantial decrease in toxic
discharge218 and construction of new waste facilities in minority
neighborhoods. 219
B. Criminal Prosecutions
Perhaps the most important current aspect of environmental
enforcement is its increasing criminalization. 220 As two scholars
have noted, this trend may be due in part to the enactment of
the Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990,221 which mandated the
EPA's hiring of two hundred environmental criminal
investigators. 222 Currently, almost every environmental statute
has some provision for imposing criminal liability.223 EPA
referrals of criminal cases to the DOJ have steadily increased
over the past two decades, and criminal fines have reached an all
217 A preliminary injunction is for the duration of the suit and will be lifted if
plaintiffs are not successful. See Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 565 (11th Cir. 1996);
Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt., 482 F. Supp. 673, 678-79 (discussing the
clustered siting of waste facilities in minority neighborhoods).
218 See supra RIESEL, note 199, § 5.03. Plaintiffs can use expert testimony to
demonstrate that the added contaminants introduced by the unlawful discharges
may result in "irreversible adverse increments to health." Id.
219 See Sierra Club v. Larson, 769 F. Supp. 420, 424 (D. Mass. 1991) (refusing to
enjoin construction of proposed ventilation system because it was not going to begin
for a number of years, which precluded a finding of imminent harm to plaintiffs
required to prove irreparable injury).
220 RIESEL, supra note 199, § 1.01; see Barry Meier's article on the
Environmental Protection Agency's criminal enforcement unit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7,
1985, at Al. (noting that from 1983 to 1985, the unit helped convict sixty
individuals and companies of criminally violating EPA statutes which was three
times as many as in similar periods in EPA history).
221 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
222 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4); see also Gaynor & Bartman, supra note 210, at 264.
223 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2000); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (2000); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(e) (2000); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (2000). Each act prescribes criminal penalties
differently. For example, the CWA counts criminal violations on a per day basis,
while the CAA follows the Alternative Fines Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3571, and doubles
maximum criminal fines in the event of a second conviction, and the RCRA has
criminal penalties more severe than those prescribed under the Alternative Fines
Act; see also RIESEL, supra note 199, § 4.01 (discussing the fine structure of the
statutes and Alternative Fines Act).
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time high. 2 2 4 The obvious drawback for environmental justice
plaintiffs is the necessity of relying on the EPA to actually refer
their suits to the DOJ for criminal prosecution. Predicting
whether the government will pursue a violation civilly,
administratively, or criminally is difficult.225 Although courts
have liberally construed the environmental statutes' criminal
penalties, there are no bright lines by which environmental
justice plaintiffs can determine the initial "prosecution-
worthiness" of their case. 226
C. Parallel Proceedings
The major environmental statutes227 authorize both criminal
and civil enforcement actions for the same violations, which
22 See Gaynor & Bartman, supra note 210, at 264 ("Criminal fines in 1997
totaled a record $169.3 million.").
225 See id. at 265.
226 Id. Gaynor & Bartman noted that during the period from 1984-1990, seven
environmental statutes formed the basis for almost every environmental criminal
prosecution. It would seem that the EPA might be more willing to refer to the DOJ
if the complaint is based upon one of the seven. Id.; see also Mark A. Cohen,
Environmental Crime & Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory & Empirical
Evidence of Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1054, 1073 (1992). Although environmental justice plaintiffs may
have no way of predicting whether the EPA will refer their case to the DOJ, it may
be comforting to know that the legal rule of holding a corporation liable for the acts
of its agents applies in the environmental context. See Apex Oil Co. v. United
States, 530 F.2d 1291, 1293, 1295 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that employee's
knowledge of corporate defendant's repeated oil spills into the Mississippi River was
imputed to the corporation, and therefore, the corporation was criminally liable
under the Water Pollution Control Act). Similarly, an individual can become liable
for crimes committed by corporations if she is guilty of "personal misconduct," she
aided and abetted the corporation's misconduct or she is "a person with
responsibility in the business process resulting in the ... crime." See Riesel, supra
note 202, at 300; see also United States v. Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d 96, 97,
100 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding conviction of real-estate business under CWA, based
on the actions of its Senior VP in causing dredging and filling of protected federal
wetlands without a permit). A person is guilty of aiding and abetting if she
"affirmatively associates himself in some way with a criminal venture." Riesel,
supra note 202, at 301; see also Unites States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1551 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding civilian maintenance foreman at military base criminally responsible
under CERCLA for ordering employees to dispose of paint by dumping it into a dirt-
filled pit). A substantial consequence of a guilty plea under an environmental
statute is suspension and debarment of the defendant from federal contracts, and
grant and loan programs. See Riesel, supra note 202, at 301. Under certain statutes,
the defendant is automatically debarred until the EPA certifies that the conditions
giving rise to the violation have been corrected. Id.
227 See, e.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(g) (civil penalty up to $25,000 per day for
violation of any statutory or regulatory requirement); id. § 6928(d) (criminal
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gives the EPA and the DOJ the option of pursuing both
simultaneously in a "parallel proceeding." 228  In appropriate
situations, civil injunctions are issued to prevent further harm
and to begin cleanup procedures, while criminal penalties are
exacted to further punish the "wrongdoer."229 Within the context
of environmental justice, this device could clearly be of
tremendous importance to an affected area, particularly one with
a high concentration of facilities, provided the EPA sees fit to
pursue it.
CONCLUSION
From its beginning to the present day, the environmental
justice movement has faced its share of social obstacles and legal
impediments. Part I of this Note described this battle. Since the
veritable closing down of Title VI by the Supreme Court as
discussed in Part II, it is incumbent upon environmental justice
plaintiffs to avail themselves of private rights of action which
they may not have used previously. One of these ways, as
described in detail in Part III, is the third party beneficiary rule.
Its origins as an equitable solution make it particularly
appealing to plaintiffs who, for reasons beyond their control, may
have a difficult time achieving the justice they deserve. Part IV
explained that, in addition to this remedy, plaintiffs also have
other equitable and criminal remedies available to them.
Although these remedies may not give environmental justice
plaintiffs the sweeping civil rights policy decisions they seek,
perhaps it is time for the movement to pursue available remedies
instead of looking down pathways that are presently closed.
Using the third party beneficiary rule, intended beneficiaries of
public programs who have been denied access to the courts
previously,can seek their remedy. In other words, it is time for
environmental justice plaintiffs to use this rule as an alternative
to the increasingly unavailable private statute-based cause of
action to gain access to justice that has long been denied.
penalties).
228 Gaynor & Bartman, supra note 210, at 297.
229 See Riesel, supra note 202, at 318.
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